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Abstract 
PERCEIVED KNOWLEDGE AND DEFENSE OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES 
by 
MATTHEW H. GOLDBERG 
Advisors: Cheryl Carmichael & Curtis Hardin 
 
Three experiments tested if perceived knowledge about a political issue predicted people’s 
willingness to engage with relatively weaker versus stronger belief-threatening information on 
that issue. Study 1 assessed people’s perceived knowledge on four political issues and, for each 
issue, manipulated whether participants chose between arguing against a weak versus moderate 
argument or a moderate versus strong argument. Only one issue provided some support for the 
primary hypothesis. When people believed they were not knowledgeable about the carbon tax, 
giving them a relatively stronger set of arguments to choose from (moderate versus strong) 
further increased their preferences for the weaker argument compared to an easier set of choices 
(weak versus moderate). When people believed they were high in knowledge of the carbon tax, 
the effect disappeared, demonstrating that they were more likely to engage with strong belief-
inconsistent information. Study 2 tested whether perceived knowledge predicted people’s 
choices of whether to counter-argue versus ignore weak versus strong belief-inconsistent 
information. Perceived knowledge predicted preferences for counter-arguing both weak and 
strong messages, but the relationship was slightly stronger for strong messages. There was also a 
strong effect of condition such that people became significantly more likely to ignore the 
information when the information was strong than when it was weak. This effect was primarily 
driven by people’s expectations that they could not effectively counter-argue strong belief-
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inconsistent information. In Study 3, people chose between two debate partners that were either 
similar in knowledge versus substantially lower in knowledge or between partners that were 
similar in knowledge versus substantially higher in knowledge. When people believed they knew 
little about the debate topic (i.e. the death penalty), their choices were unaffected by the available 
options; when people believed they knew a lot about the topic, they consistently chose the more 
knowledgeable debate partner. These findings suggest that people’s perceived knowledge and 
their beliefs about their ability to effectively counter-argue belief-inconsistent information play 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Voter ignorance is a widely recognized phenomenon in American politics (Arnold, 2012; 
Althaus, 1998). In spite of their ignorance, people still find ways to defend their political beliefs 
from dissent. Although people can protect their beliefs by expending more effort criticizing 
belief-inconsistent information (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Ditto & Lopez, 1992) or avoiding it 
altogether (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), successfully arguing against strong information provides a 
greater epistemic benefit than arguing against weak information because it increases attitude 
certainty (Tormala & Petty, 2002). The proposed research is designed to show that, as people’s 
self-perceived knowledge on an issue increases, their tendency to choose to approach strong 
belief-inconsistent information will increase. Additionally, I propose that people will approach 
the strongest belief-inconsistent information that they believe they can refute. That is, when 
people believe they are highly knowledgeable, they will choose to argue against strong rather 
than weak belief-inconsistent information because refuting strong information proves the 
superiority of one’s beliefs more than refuting weak information.  
For example, when people believe they are high in political knowledge they should 
expect a high probability of successfully counter-arguing criticisms of their political views. Such 
people should be more inclined to approach strong belief-inconsistent information because 
counter-arguing strong information increases attitude certainty whereas counter-arguing weak 
information does not (Tormala & Petty, 2002; also see Tormala & Petty, 2004). People who 
believe they are low in political knowledge recognize their limited ways of defending their 
beliefs and should therefore only approach belief-inconsistent information when it is weak—
when they know that they can refute it.  
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 Learning about how people defend their political attitudes is crucial to understanding how 
to effectively relay information to the uninformed electorate. However, the influence of 
perceived knowledge on information search remains unclear. Thus, it is important to learn more 
about people’s willingness to engage with information that challenges their political position. 
Cognitive Energetics Theory (CET; Kruglanski, Bélanger, Chen, Köpetz, Pierro, & Mannetti, 
2012) provides a guiding theoretical framework for thinking about the kinds of information with 
which people seek to engage. 
Cognitive Energetics Theory 
 CET uses the early terminology of Lewin (1936) to describe how motivated cognition 
predicts goal pursuit. That is, it assumes that goal attainment is guided by a driving force and a 
restraining force. A driving force represents the maximal amount of energy that a person is 
willing to invest in attaining a cognitive goal whereas a restraining force limits this energy.  
Primary driving forces include the importance of attaining the cognitive goal and the 
amount of available mental resources. The most prominent example of this is at the core of the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) in which students read arguments 
in favor of imposing a comprehensive exam for all students at their university or at a distant 
university. For students in the condition that imposes the exam at their own university, it raises 
the driving force (i.e. personal importance or vested interest) and thus leads the students to 
deeply process the message content because the new exam will directly affect them. For students 
in the condition that imposes the exam at a distant university, there is little vested interest in the 
outcome, and therefore they will rely on shortcuts in evaluating the information (e.g. source 
expertise) rather than the argument content. This demonstrates that, when a task is of high 
importance, people will invest more energy in the task. 
  3  
The amount of available mental resources is also a critical component of the driving 
force. For example, Kruglanski and Thompson (1999, Study 3) manipulated whether participants 
were to evaluate information under high or low cognitive load. The researchers then manipulated 
whether or not the information came from an expert source (expert vs. inexpert) and the length of 
the source background information (short vs. long). When under high cognitive load, participants 
relied more on the brief, but less informative, information to form their judgments whereas 
participants under low cognitive load relied more on the lengthy, but more informative, 
information. Inducing high cognitive load reduced participants’ driving force towards attaining 
the goal of accurately judging the relevant information whereas people with the available mental 
resources (i.e. low cognitive load) were more willing to invest more energy in the task. 
On the other hand, a restraining force inhibits goal pursuit via processes such as task 
difficulty or competing goals. For example, political partisans might be highly motivated (i.e. 
high driving force) to defend their favorite candidate’s tax policy but will be limited in their 
ability to do so if they face strong counter-arguments from opposing partisans (i.e. high 
restraining force). Shah and Kruglanski (2002) activated a high driving force in students to 
perform well on an anagram task by telling them it measured “verbal recall,” which the 
experimenters described as a valuable skill for writing. The researchers demonstrate that, 
compared to priming task-related goals (i.e. performing well on the anagram task), priming 
alternative goals (i.e. increased restraining force) led to worse performance on anagram tasks. 
Activating an alternative goal increased the restraining force on performing well on the anagram 
task.  
Although CET states that the driving and restraining forces are separable, it also states 
that they are functionally equivalent. That is, for example, raising the restraining force is 
  4  
analogous to reducing the driving force. CET states that when people are have a high driving 
force, they seek to choose the most effective way of attaining their cognitive goal even if that 
means investing more energy. For example, Pierro, De Grada, Mannetti, Livi, and Kruglanski 
(2004) demonstrate that people rely on cognitive shortcuts (e.g. consensus information) when 
they have a low driving force but they rely more on argument content when they have a high 
driving force. Relying primarily on consensus information is fallacious because it does not reveal 
anything about the arguments themselves. Put simply, people rely on this more efficient, but less 
valid, technique for understanding information when they are unmotivated to deeply process it 
(also see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). On the other hand, when people are highly motivated (i.e. 
high driving force), they will use more laborious ways of processing information (e.g. assessing 
message arguments) to the extent that is serves an appropriately important cognitive goal.  
 Because the primary goal of the current project is to investigate how perceived 
knowledge predicts people’s willingness to engage with information that contradicts their 
political beliefs, we will select for people that are highly motivated to defend those beliefs. 
People who are strongly committed (Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Kiesler, 1971) or have publicly 
advocated for their position (for a review see Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2008), for 
example, will have a strong driving force that motivates them to defend their political beliefs 
whereas politically unaffiliated people are relatively less likely to be similarly motivated. In the 
context of this project, the restraining force is the perceived likelihood of successfully refuting 
the belief-inconsistent information. Thus, people with low perceived knowledge should be less 
likely to engage with belief-inconsistent information than people with high perceived knowledge 
because their lower likelihood of successfully counter-arguing it will act like a restraining force. 
Perceived Knowledge and Preference for Belief-Inconsistent Information 
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It is well known that people tend to prefer information that is consistent with their 
existing beliefs rather than information that is inconsistent with them (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; 
for a meta-analysis see Hart et al., 2009). Although the research on selective exposure spans 
many domains (e.g. personality feedback, majority influence, consumer behavior), political 
information exposure has been a popular topic in this area. Stroud (2008) found that liberals 
follow news sources that correspond to liberal positions whereas conservatives follow news 
sources that correspond to conservative positions. Further, Sweeney and Gruber (1984) 
demonstrate that Richard Nixon supporters demonstrated less interest and knowledge about the 
Watergate affair than people who supported a different candidate. People who supported Nixon 
were motivated to defend their positive view of him and avoiding negative information about 
him was one way to maintain a favorable attitude towards him. 
People demonstrate this preference for belief-consistent information in order to avoid 
self-threat (Steele, 1988) or psychological discomfort (Festinger, 1957; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; 
Blanton, Strauts, & Perez, 2012). For example, Steele (1988) explains that people are motivated 
to maintain a positive view of the self and therefore belief-inconsistent information can be 
threatening and unpleasant. If a great math student receives a poor grade on a test in which she 
expected to do well, this elicits self-threat that she may actually not be as good a math student as 
she believed. The same idea applies to peoples’ political positions. If political partisans are 
confronted with strong negative information about their party’s platform, it is threatening 
because it raises the idea that they are not informed. Thus, she will be motivated to avoid the 
threat-arousing information. 
However, exceptions occur to the general preference for belief-consistent information, 
particularly when belief-inconsistent information is weak (Lowin, 1967) or if the person is highly 
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confident that they can defend their views (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). For example, Lowin 
(1967) created and distributed brochures to people during the 1964 presidential campaign that 
argued in favor of one of the candidates. He manipulated whether the information was consistent 
or inconsistent with the participant’s political attitudes and ease of refutation (weak vs. strong 
arguments) to determine whether participants would respond to the offer of more information or 
ignore it. People accepted the offer of more information arguing in favor of their own party’s 
candidate more frequently than information favoring the opposing party’s candidate, but only 
when the arguments were strong. When the arguments were weak, however, people preferred the 
information arguing in favor of their opposing party’s candidate to information favoring their 
own party’s candidate. Put simply, people prefer strong information that supports their beliefs or 
weak information that goes against their beliefs. People seek out information that goes against 
their beliefs when they can easily refute it. As opposed to strong belief-inconsistent information, 
weak belief-inconsistent information has a smaller chance of causing cognitive conflict. 
Moreover, refuting a weak opposing argument further proves the superiority of one’s own 
argument. Thus, counter-arguing is another way of protecting oneself from the cognitive conflict 
resulting from belief threat.  
Although people may prefer belief-inconsistent information when it is weak as opposed 
to strong, Tormala and Petty (2002) demonstrated that participants feel more certain after 
successfully counter-arguing strong arguments than weak arguments. This is because defeating 
strong criticisms reifies one’s existing beliefs whereas counter-arguing weak arguments does not. 
Similarly, counter-arguing against a high-status source increases attitude certainty but counter-
arguing a low-status source does not (Tormala & Petty, 2004). People seem inclined to reason, 
“if my position withstands strong attacks, it must be a good position!” This suggests that counter-
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arguing high-quality information provides an epistemic function—assuring people that their 
committed beliefs remain unchallenged. 
As the above evidence suggests, successfully counter-arguing against strong, but not 
weak, information makes people more certain of their own beliefs. Thus, people who believe 
they have the necessary knowledge should choose to argue against strong belief-inconsistent 
information because refuting it provides them with an opportunity to increase their certainty. On 
the other hand, people with low perceived knowledge believe they lack the political knowledge 
to counter-argue strong information, making weak belief-inconsistent information preferable. 
This leads us to expect that people who have high perceived political knowledge, and thus a high 
driving force, would prefer strong rather than weak belief-inconsistent information whereas 
people with low political knowledge, and thus a low driving force, would prefer weak rather than 
strong belief-inconsistent information. 
The research reported here is novel and innovative in two ways. First, whereas past 
research has focused on the consequences of counter-arguing, this research focuses on 
preferences for counter-arguing. Second, I examined the role of perceived knowledge, which 
helps us investigate whether people prefer to refute strong belief-inconsistent information if they 
believe they have the knowledge to do so. This sheds light on factors that influence the defensive 
biases people prefer, such as whether people avoid or engage with information that contradicts 
their political beliefs. 
Overview of the Current Research 
In three interrelated studies, I tested how people defended their political attitudes as a 
function of their perceived political knowledge. In Study 1, I measured perceived knowledge on 
four issues and manipulated whether people chose between arguing against a weak versus 
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moderate argument or a moderate versus strong argument. In Study 2, I measured perceived 
political knowledge and manipulated the strength of the belief-inconsistent information people 
received (i.e. weak versus strong). Study 2 is novel because the dependent measure tested 
whether people chose to engage with or ignore the argument (i.e. complete an unrelated task) as 
opposed to choosing between two arguments. In Study 3, I administered a political knowledge 
quiz, assigned participants a fake score, and manipulated the ostensible scores of potential 
disagreeing discussion partners to see if participants chose to engage in a debate with someone 
who was slightly versus substantially less (or slightly vs. substantially more) politically 
knowledgeable than themselves. 
Power Analysis 
 The novel paradigm of the reported studies made it difficult to determine an informed 
effect size estimate. According to Cohen (1988), a rule-of-thumb convention for a small odds 
ratio in the social sciences is 1.49. We used the G*power software to compute the necessary 
effect size needed to observe this effect with 80% power (for details on G*Power software, see 
Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Assuming an odds ratio of 1.49, we needed a minimum 
of 214 participants per study.  
Chapter 2: Study 1 
 Study 1 explored people’s preferences for arguing against a strong versus relatively 
weaker argument. This study sought to test if people choose to argue against stronger arguments 
to the degree that they are knowledgeable on that issue. In order to test the boundary conditions 
of preferring to argue against stronger arguments (i.e. preferring to counter stronger arguments 
up to a point), I manipulated whether participants chose between arguing against a weak versus 
moderate argument or between a moderate versus strong argument. If perceived issue knowledge 
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predicts preferences for countering stronger arguments, then this study is an appropriate test of 
how this relationship changes depending on the relative strength of the available arguments.  
Method 
Participants 
 Four hundred and fifty-six people (45% female, Mage = 33.45, SDage = 9.65) were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The TurkPrime software was used to launch the 
study and restrict access to people in the United States, with a minimal task approval rate of 
85%, and a minimum of 100 tasks completed on Mechanical Turk (Litman, Robinson, & 
Abberbock, 2016). Six participants were removed for failing the attention check (see Materials 
section below; also see Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). The final sample contained 
450 participants.1 
Procedure 
Participants first answered questions about their positions and perceived political 
knowledge on 4 policy issues (gun control, death penalty, junk food tax, and carbon tax). Next, 
participants made a series of 4 forced-choices in which they chose between arguing against a 
relatively stronger versus weaker message criticizing their political views. For each of the four 
issues, participants were randomly assigned to choose between a weak and moderate argument or 
a moderate and strong argument. This was repeated for all four issues. Then participants 
completed a political knowledge quiz assessing their identification of political public figures as 
well as their political party knowledge. Lastly, I assessed participants reported behaviors about 
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 Attrition Remedy. After reading a general description of the study, participants 
completed a task aimed at reducing participant attrition (see Zhou & Fishbach, 2016). 
Participants read “Many mTurk workers tend to quit once they see the tasks. If a sizable 
number of people quit the survey halfway, the data quality of that survey would be 
compromised. However, our research depends on good quality data. Thus, before taking this 
survey, please make sure you do not mind completing the tasks described on the previous page.” 
Then participants were instructed, “Please type below ‘I will complete the full survey’ so that we 
can ensure your data will be of high quality. Thank you!” and then there was a text box for them 
to type the requested sentence and another that asked for their mTurk identification number. 
 Attention Check. I used an attention check to ensure that participants were not 
mindlessly responding (Goldberg & Carmichael, 2017). Participants were shown a paragraph of 
text that appeared to be asking participants to select the political activities in which they 
regularly engage (e.g. signing petitions, protesting). After three sentences, the message instructed 
the participant to ignore the instructions and click on an option they would otherwise never 
choose (“Run for president of the USA”) and ignore all other options. 
Issue Attitudes. Participants indicated their position on 4 issues (Gun control, Junk food 
tax, Carbon tax, and Death penalty). For example, “Do you favor or oppose stricter gun control 
laws?” (Favor vs. Oppose). For each issue attitude, participants rated their perceived issue 
knowledge with 4 items (e.g. “How knowledgeable do you feel on this issue?”; “To what extent 
do you feel you know the most relevant facts about this issue?”; “How much information do you 
feel you have on this issue?”; “To what extent do you feel you have expertise on this issue?”; 1 = 
Not at all, 9 = Extremely; α Gun control = .90, α Junk food tax = .94, α Carbon tax = .95, α Death penalty = .94; 
see Rios, Goldberg, & Totton, 2017). Participants also rated the strength of their position (1 = 
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Extremely oppose, 9 = Extremely favor). Finally, participants rated the importance of the issue, 
their attitude correctness, and their attitude clarity (all scales; 1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely). 
Choice Tasks. Participants were told that they were going make a series of 4 choices 
between two tasks on each page, and that they would actually complete one of the tasks that they 
chose. Each choice was between arguing against a relatively stronger and a relatively weaker 
criticism of the participant’s issue position. For each of the four issues, participants were 
randomly assigned to read a weak and moderate argument or a moderate and strong argument 
against their position on that issue (for all arguments, see Appendix A).  
The survey software automatically displayed the appropriate stimuli (i.e. belief-
inconsistent arguments) to participants. Participants were asked to choose which argument (weak 
vs. moderate; moderate vs. strong) they preferred to argue against. They repeated this choice task 
for each issue until all four issues were completed. After they completed their last choice, they 
proceeded to the next screen where the argument they had chosen for the death penalty 
reappeared along with an essay text box that allowed them to respond to their chosen argument.  
The strength of the arguments was determined by pilot testing (N = 75). As in the full 
study, participants in the pilot were randomly assigned to read a weak and moderate argument or 
a moderate and strong argument against the participant’s position. Weak arguments were defined 
by the use of only assertions and anecdotes without empirical evidence. Strong arguments were 
defined by the use of multiple kinds of strong empirical evidence from authoritative sources in 
which the evidence points to large impacts in the research findings. Moderate arguments were 
defined by the use of generic sources (e.g. scientists) that pointed to some impact of the findings 
cited, but less certain and powerful than those cited in the strong arguments. Participants were 
asked to rate the strength of each argument they received (1 = Extremely weak, 7 = Extremely 
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strong). In all cases, a paired samples t-test determined that the moderate argument was rated 
significantly stronger than the weak argument and the strong argument was rated significantly 
stronger than the moderate argument (see Tables 1a and 1b). 
Political Agreement/Disagreement. Four questions measured people’s general exposure 
to agreeing and disagreeing others on social media and in person. For example, “How often do 
you [AGREE/DISAGREE] with political opinions and contents that other people post on social 
media?” (Never, Only sometimes, Often, Always or nearly always). Participants also answered 
the same two questions, one asking about agreement and one about disagreement, regarding their 
opinion exposure in face-to-face interactions. These items were included for exploratory 
purposes. 
Political Knowledge Quiz. Participants answered 10 factual questions on public figure 
identification and party knowledge. Questions gauging public figure identification asked about 
various people in office (e.g. “John Roberts. What job or political office does he now hold?”; 
“Michael Pence. What job or political office does he now hold?”). Questions gauging party 
knowledge asked participants to indicate whether a given position is a Democratic or Republican 
policy position (e.g. “Which party is generally more supportive of restricting abortion?”; “Which 
party is generally more supportive of a ‘path to citizenship’?”). We administered this measure 
after the forced choices task to ensure that taking the quiz will not affect people’s choices about 
whether to engage with weak, moderate, or strong arguments. Objective knowledge is unlikely to 
be affected by the choices task and therefore it was preferable to administer the quiz subsequent 
to the choice tasks. 
Demographics. Lastly, participants completed demographic information such as their 
age, sex, and political ideology (1 = Very liberal, 7 = Very conservative). 
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Results 
 I hypothesized that perceived issue knowledge would predict preferences for arguing 
against the stronger argument when the choice was between a weak and moderate argument and 
that this effect would disappear when the choice was between a moderate and strong argument. 
To test this hypothesis, I entered Condition (0 = Weak vs. Moderate; 1 = Moderate vs. Strong), 
Issue Perceived Knowledge, and the interaction term into a logistic regression model predicting 
argument choice (0 = Weaker argument; 1 = Stronger argument). I ran the same model 
separately for each issue (Gun control, Junk food tax, Carbon tax, and Death penalty).  
For the issue of gun control, the Condition × Perceived Knowledge interaction was not 
significant, (b = -.09, SE = .11), z(442) = -.82, p = .412, 95% CI [-.31, .13]. However, the main 
effect of Condition was significant, (b = -.40, SE = .20), z(442) = -2.00, p = .045, 95% CI [-.78, -
.01]. That is, when participants had a choice between arguing against a weak or moderate 
argument, participants chose the weaker argument 57% of the time. When they had a choice 
between a moderate and strong argument, participants preferred the relatively weaker argument 
(i.e. moderate argument) even more strongly, 67% of the time, OR = 1.49, 95% CI [1.01, 2.19]. 
The main effect of Perceived Knowledge was not significant, (b = .03, SE = .06), z(442) = .60, p 
= .550, 95% CI [-.08, .14]. 
 For the issue of the junk food tax, the Condition × Perceived Knowledge interaction was 
not significant, (b = .10, SE = .09), z(444) = -1.09, p = .275, 95% CI [-28, .08]. The main effect 
for Condition was not significant, (b = .17, SE = .19), z(444) = .89, p = .372, 95% CI [-.21, .56]. 
The main effect of Perceived Knowledge was marginal such that higher perceived knowledge 
was associated with higher odds of choosing to argue against the relatively stronger argument, (b 
= .08, SE = .05), z(444) = 1.73, p = .084, 95% CI [-.01, .17]. 
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 For the issue of the carbon tax, the Condition X Perceived Knowledge was significant, (b 
= .22, SE = .09), z(446) = 2.44, p = .015, 95% CI [.04, .40]. When participants reported low 
perceived knowledge of carbon taxes (-1SD), the difference between conditions was significant, 
(b = -.85, SE = .28), z(446) = -2.99, p = .003, 95% CI [-1.40, -.29]. That is, when participants 
received a choice between a moderate and strong argument, it led to 2.34 times the odds of 
choosing the relatively weaker argument than when participants received a choice between a 
weak and moderate argument, OR = 2.34, 95% CI [1.34, 4.07]2. When participants reported high 
perceived knowledge of carbon taxes (+1SD), the difference between conditions disappeared, (b 
= .12, SE = .27), z(446) = .43, p = .667, 95% CI [-.41, .65]. See Figure 1 for a depiction of the 
interaction. The main effect of Condition was marginal, (b = -.37, SE = .19), z(446) = -1.89, p = 
.059, 95% CI [-.75, .01]. That is, people preferred the relatively weaker argument 53% of the 
time when their choice was between a weak and moderate argument but their preference for the 
weaker argument increased to 62% when their choice was between a moderate and strong 
argument. 
 For the issue of the death penalty, the Condition × Perceived Knowledge was not 
significant, (b = .01, SE = .10), z(446) = -.15, p = .879, 95% CI [-.20, .17]. Neither main effect of 
Condition nor Perceived Knowledge was significant (ps > .4)  
Discussion 
Hypotheses for Study 1 were not confirmed. The main theoretical argument received 
partial confirmation for only one issue, the carbon tax. When participants reported low perceived 
knowledge on the carbon tax, their preferences for the relatively weaker argument became 
significantly stronger when they were given a relatively stronger set of argument choices 
																																																								
2	The	signs	of	the	odds	ratios	reported	for	this	interaction	were	reversed	for	ease	of	explanation	and	interpretation.		
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(moderate vs. strong) compared to when they were given a weaker set of choices (weak vs. 
moderate). This increase in preference for the weaker argument can be interpreted as imposing a 
greater restraining force on participants, thereby increasing their desire to avoid the stronger 
argument. Thus, one’s desire to avoid the strong argument should be enhanced when the 
argument is especially strong (in the moderate vs. strong condition) compared to when it is 
moderately strong (in the weak vs. moderate condition). When participants reported high 
perceived knowledge on the carbon tax, however, this preference disappeared and leaned 
towards (although non-significantly) a preference for relatively stronger arguments. In effect, 
participants had a higher driving force to defeat the available arguments and were therefore less 
influenced by the relatively more difficult set of arguments. Although this does not exactly 
conform to the original hypothesis, it lends some merit to the idea that people with high 
perceived knowledge are more likely than people with low perceived knowledge to seek out 
stronger arguments to argue against. 
There was a main effect of condition for both gun control and carbon tax. In both cases 
the main effect demonstrated that people modestly preferred to argue against a weak argument to 
a moderate argument but preferred to argue against the moderate argument at a substantially 
higher rate when the alternative was a strong argument. Simply put, people demonstrated 
stronger preferences for the relatively weaker argument when they chose between a stronger set 
of arguments (e.g. moderate vs. strong) compared to when they choose between a weaker set of 
arguments (e.g. weak vs. moderate). The fact that the effects of condition were modest and not 
moderated by perceived knowledge in three of the four issues suggests that the above findings be 
interpreted with caution.  
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A potential methodological flaw that may explain why this study’s hypotheses were not 
confirmed is that participants’ perceived issue knowledge might not adequately capture whether 
participants believe they could refute the specific information in the belief-inconsistent 
arguments. For example, it is entirely possible that people with high perceived knowledge prefer 
to argue against stronger arguments they believe they can refute, but our perceived knowledge 
measure did not assess whether participants believed they could refute the specific message they 
received in the study. One way to address this issue is to include questions that ask participants 
about their perceived ability to counter-argue the specific message they receive. If indeed the 
main flaw of Study 1 was that the perceived knowledge measure did not appropriately measure 
one’s perceived ability to counter-argue to messages they read, then using a better measure in 
Study 2 would produce more convincing results. For example, it may be better to ask, “how 
likely are you to effectively counter-argue the argument above?” than the general knowledge 
questions we asked in Study 1 such as “how much knowledge do you feel you have on this 
issue?” because the former asks about the specific argument in the task whereas the latter asks 
about the participants’ general perceived knowledge.  
Additionally, more research is needed to explore the factors that predict whether someone 
will use one defense strategy over another strategy (e.g. counter-argue versus ignore) as opposed 
to arguing against one message over another. Giving participants more flexibility in how to 
defend their beliefs should give us more insight into what they would do if they were 
unconstrained by the experimental procedures. This is the main contribution of Study 2. 
Chapter 3: Study 2 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to test how the strength of a belief-inconsistent message 
influences how people defend against it, such as deciding whether to counter-argue the message 
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or ignore it. Study 2 explored a situation in which participants rated their perceived issue 
knowledge, were randomly assigned to receive either a weak or strong argument against their 
issue position, gauged their ability to counter-argue the argument, and had the choice between 
counter-arguing the message on the screen or to complete an unrelated task. If people are more 
interested in counter-arguing against stronger arguments if they have the knowledge to do so, 
then I hypothesize that perceived knowledge will predict preferences for counter-arguing when 
participants receive a strong belief-inconsistent message but will predict preferences for ignoring 
the message when it is weak. 
Method 
Participants 
 Four hundred and twenty-eight people participated in this study through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. The TurkPrime software (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016) was used to 
make the same participant restrictions as Study 1 (from the U.S.A., minimum 85% task approval, 
minimum 100 tasks completed). Ten participants were removed for failing the attention check. 
The final sample contained 418 participants3. 
Procedure 
In Study 2, participants answered the same questions as in Study 1 that tap into their 
policy positions and their perceived issue knowledge for the issues of gun control and the death 
penalty. Next, participants were randomly assigned to receive a strong or weak argument against 
their political position on one of the issues. Participants then rated their perceived likelihood of 
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written argument against the message or complete a writing task unrelated to their political 
beliefs. The dependent variable was participants’ decision to argue versus ignore the message. 
Materials  
Argument Manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either a weak 
or strong argument that criticized their position on either gun control or the death penalty. We 
reduced this study to two issues because gun control and the death penalty are likely to be more 
familiar to participants, and therefore participants are more likely to have a clearer position on 
these issues than on the issues of junk food or carbon taxes. Additionally, given the same sample 
size, it is more statistically powerful to use two issues instead of four. The strong and weak 
arguments for these issues were identical to those in Study 1.  
Choice Task. Participants were instructed to choose between arguing against the 
information or completing another unrelated task that has been equated for interest and difficulty. 
Participants read, “The task on this page is to spend the next 3 minutes arguing against the 
message below. However, we understand that some participants might want to complete a 
different task instead. We pretested several other tasks to ensure they take the same amount of 
time and effort so you may choose to complete the current task or an alternative unrelated task.”  
Expectations of Effective Counter-Arguing. After reading the argument criticizing 
their position on the randomly selected issue (Gun control or the Death penalty), participants 
answered four questions measuring their expectations of effective counter-arguing (see 
Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). Participants rated how likely they were to “effectively counter-
argue the argument above,” “effectively refute the argument above”, “identify problems in the 
argument above”, “know counter-arguments to the argument above” (1 = Extremely unlikely, 9 = 
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Extremely likely). These four items were averaged to form a composite measure of expectations 
of effective counter-arguing (α = .95) 
Instructions for Chosen Task. If participants chose to complete the counter-arguing 
task, they were instructed on the next page “Please spend the next three minutes arguing against 
the message above.” If participants chose to complete the unrelated task, they were instructed on 
the next page “Please spend the next three minutes describing what political issue is most 
important to you and why.” After making their choice, participants completed their chosen task 
and answered basic demographic questions. 
Results 
 I hypothesized that, when participants receive a strong criticism of their position, 
perceived issue knowledge would positively predict a preference for arguing against the criticism 
(vs. choosing to do the unrelated task). When participants receive a weak criticism, I predicted 
that perceived issue knowledge would negatively predict a preference for arguing against the 
criticism (i.e. preference for doing an unrelated task). To test this hypothesis, I first tested the 
Condition (Weak vs. Strong) × Perceived Knowledge × Issue (Gun control vs. Death penalty) 
interaction to ensure that the hypothesized effects were not moderated by issue. It was not 
significant, (b = -.19, SE = .28), z(410) = -.68, p = .499, 95% CI [-.74, .36] and therefore I 
collapsed across issue and tested the Condition (Weak vs. Strong) × Perceived Knowledge 
interaction predicting task choice (0 = Counter-argue task, 1 = Unrelated task). Although the 
interaction was not significant, (b = -.19, SE = .14), z(414) = -1.39, p = .163, 95% CI [-.46, .08], 
the pattern of results lend partial support to my theoretical argument. Unexpectedly, when 
participants received a weak argument, perceived knowledge significantly predicted preferences 
to counter-argue over completing an unrelated task, (b = -.19, SE = .08), z(414) = -2.47, p = .014, 
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95% CI [-.34, .04]. That is, each one unit increase in perceived knowledge led to 21% greater 
odds of choosing to counter-argue, OR = 1.21, 95% CI [1.04, 1.41]. In line with the hypothesis, 
however, when participants received a strong argument, this relationship got even stronger, (b = -
.38, SE = .11), z(414) = -3.35, p < .001, 95% CI [-.61, -.16]. That is, each one unit increase in 
perceived knowledge led to a 47% greater odds of choosing to counter-argue, OR = 1.47, 95% 
CI [1.17, 1.84] (See Figure 2).  
The main effect of condition was significant such that participants were significantly 
more likely to choose the unrelated task (i.e. ignore the argument) when they received a strong 
argument than when they received a weak argument, (b = 1.03, SE = .25), z(414) = 4.14, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.54, 1.52]. That is, when participants received a strong argument it led to 2.80 
times the odds of choosing the unrelated task over counter-arguing, OR = 2.80, 95% CI [1.72, 
4.57]. The main effect of perceived knowledge was significant such that participants were 
significantly more likely choose to counter-argue as perceived knowledge increased, (b = -.28, 
SE = .07), z(414) = -4.16, p < .001, 95% CI [-.41, -.15]. 
In an attempt to more precisely test if people seek to counter-argue messages only to the 
degree they believe they could do so successfully, I used the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 
4; Hayes, 2013) to test if the relationship between Condition (X; Weak vs. Strong) and Task 
Choice (Y; 0 = Counter-argue task, 1 = Unrelated task) was mediated by their perceived 
expectations of effective counter-arguing (M; continuous). Compared to when participants 
received a weak argument, giving participants a strong argument increased participants’ 
preferences for the unrelated task indirectly through their perceptions that they could not 
effectively counter-argue the message. Put another way, giving participants a weak belief-
inconsistent message increased their belief that they could effectively counter-argue it, which in 
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turn predicted preferences for counter-arguing over completing the unrelated task (i.e. ignoring 
the message; see Figure 3). Bootstrapping revealed that the indirect effect was significantly 
different from zero (b = .61, SEboot = .14), 95% CIboot [.38, .93]. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 findings confirm the hypothesis that, when participants received a strong 
argument, perceived knowledge predicted preferences for counter-arguing as opposed to 
completing an unrelated task. I did not expect to find that, when the argument was weak, 
perceived knowledge also predicted preferences for counter-arguing. Although this was not 
expected—and the interaction not quite significant—these results provide some support for my 
theoretical argument that people prefer to argue against a strong argument to the degree they 
believe they have the knowledge to do so and that this relationship was somewhat weaker when 
participants received a weak argument. I proposed that this is because people become more 
certain after arguing against strong (as opposed to weak) arguments (Tormala & Petty, 2002; 
2004). Thus, people should see greater value in counter-arguing a strong criticism of their beliefs 
than a weak one and that people would choose to counter-argue accordingly. It is also possible, 
however, that perceived knowledge was a weaker predictor in the weak condition because most 
people believed they could successfully counter-argue. 
It is worth noting that there was no level of perceived knowledge at which participants’ 
majority choice was to counter-argue. In other words, participants always chose to ignore at a 
higher rate than counter-argue. However, as perceived knowledge increased, participants’ 
preferences to counter-argue also increased. 
 The analysis of mechanism was promising. Compared to when participants received a 
strong argument, receiving a weak argument cause participants to increase their expectations that 
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they could effectively counter-argue which in turn led participants to increase their preference 
for counter-arguing instead of ignoring. The fact that expectations of effective counter-arguing 
strongly predicted preferences for counter-arguing suggests that there is epistemic value in 
counter-arguing over ignoring. If people’s cognitive goal is to feel certain about their beliefs, 
Cognitive Energetics Theory would predict that people will invest the necessary energy to 
maintain certainty even if the task is more laborious than alternative tasks. Ignoring the 
information leaves the cognitive discrepancy intact whereas counter-arguing does not. Thus, it is 
more defensively advantageous to counter-argue than to ignore if one believes they can counter-
argue successfully. In terms of CET, people who believe they will be successful in counter-
arguing have a high driving force and will be more likely to choose the task that fits their 
cognitive goal of maintaining attitude certainty. 
 Taken together, these findings are encouraging for future research that will help identify 
the factors that predict people’s choice of belief-defense. Given that people still largely chose to 
ignore the belief-inconsistent information suggests that information avoidance will continue to 
be an obstacle in fostering intergroup communication. 
 One limitation of Study 2 is that participants got to see the argument that they might 
choose to argue against (versus ignore) before making their decision. Thus, they were likely fully 
aware of whether or not they could successfully counter-argue the message. When engaging with 
disagreeing others, it is not always clear what the other person might argue in defending their 
position, so this might breed more or less perceived “risk” of arguing with the other person. In 
Study 3, I use a novel paradigm to manipulate the perceived issue knowledge of the participant’s 
potential debate partner, which should provide more insight into the differences between 
choosing arguments versus choosing someone to debate. 
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Chapter 4: Study 3 
 In Study 3 I investigated people’s choice of debate partner depending on the partner’s 
ostensible issue knowledge. In Studies 1 and 2 I manipulated participants’ exposure to arguments 
of varying strength. In Study 3, on the other hand, I manipulated participants’ choices of a debate 
partner. I reasoned that people would be less interested in debating someone with substantially 
lower knowledge than themselves because there would be little to epistemically gain from the 
debate. If people have a high driving force to maintain or even increase attitude certainty, then 
this goal would be best achieved by arguing against someone who is relatively high in 
knowledge (Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004), but not so high as to pose a risk of decreasing 
certainty. Thus, I expected that participants would choose a debate partner with similar issue 
knowledge over one with substantially lower knowledge. However, I expected that when people 
had a choice between someone with similar issue knowledge or substantially more knowledge, it 
would create a greater risk of their beliefs being truly challenged if they were to choose the 
substantially more knowledgeable partner. Therefore, people would again prefer a debate partner 
with similar knowledge to oneself.  
Method 
Participants 
 Four hundred and fifty two people participated in this study through Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (46% female, Mage = 36.22, SDage = 11.94). Like Studies 1 and 2, I used the TurkPrime 
software (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016) to limit study access to people in United 
States, with a minimum task approval of 85%, and a minimum of 100 tasks completed on 
Mechanical Turk. Twelve people were removed from analyses because they did not believe the 
discussion would be real. 
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Procedure 
First, participants answered basic demographic questions such as age and sex. Then 
participants indicated their position on gun control and the death penalty. For each issue, 
participants answered questions measuring their perceived knowledge for each issue. Then 
participants took a quiz that ostensibly measured their knowledge on the death penalty. 
Participants then proceeded to the next page that stated that their results were being calculated. 
After being given false feedback about their knowledge score (which was identical for all 
participants), I manipulated participants’ choice between two debate partners, both of whom 
always had the opposite opinion of the participant. The two potential debate partners’ death 
penalty knowledge scores were also displayed. Participants were randomly assigned to choose 
between 1) a discussion partner with a similar death penalty knowledge score and one with a 
significantly lower score or between 2) a discussion partner with a similar death penalty 
knowledge score and one with a significantly higher score. Participants made their choice, 
completed a suspicion probe, and then were informed that there would be no debate. 
Materials 
Demographics. First, participants indicated their age, sex, and political identification (1 
= Very liberal, 7 = Very conservative).  
Issue Positions. Then participants answered the same questions from Studies 1 and 2 on 
their position on gun control and the death penalty (Favor vs. Oppose) and four items for each 
issue measuring their perceived knowledge (α = .93).   
Political Knowledge Quiz. Participants took a political knowledge multiple choice quiz 
and were given a score that ostensibly measured their political knowledge on the death penalty. 
The quiz was constructed using easy, moderate, and difficult questions so that assigning all 
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participants a moderate score (i.e. 67th percentile) was believable (for all quiz questions and 
answer choices, see Appendix B). For example, an easy question was “What is the most accurate 
definition of capital punishment?” whereas a difficult question was “What is the average cost to 
tax payers of life in prison?” On the following page they read “Your quiz results are being 
calculated. Please move on to the next page to view your results.”  
Once participants move on to the next page, they read “The results of this quiz indicate 
that you answered 6/10 of the questions correctly. This means that you scored higher than 67% 
of your peers.” The participant’s score was held constant for all participants.  
Debate Partner Manipulation. On the following page, participants read that they would 
be debating the topic of the death penalty with another worker from Mechanical Turk (for a 
similar procedure, see Rios, Goldberg, & Totton, 2017). They read: 
“In this part of the study, we are interested in how people talk about controversial issues 
with others. You will participate in an online discussion with another person who is 
currently logged into this study. 
  
Recently, we have taken advantage of a special new feature in our survey design system, 
which allows us to connect you with people who are also currently participating in this 
study. Because this is such a massive study, and online experiments on Mechanical Turk 
are so convenient and popular, it generally takes less than a minute to connect you via our 
chat feature to another participant who has the opposite opinion as you do on the death 
penalty. 
  
For this discussion, you can choose between two people that have been randomly selected 
by our survey system. Please go to the next screen to make this choice.” 
 
On the following page, participants were reminded of their knowledge score and told that 
a choice of two possible debate partners were randomly selected from which they can choose to 
debate. For both potential debate partners, an 8-digit identification number, the person’s position 
on the death penalty, and the person’s quiz score (measuring knowledge of the death penalty) 
were displayed. The debate partners’ scores were shown in a similar format to the participant’s 
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score. For example, “Quiz score: 3/10, which is better than 36% of your peers.” Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two sets of partner choices. The choice between discussion 
partners was either 1) a discussion partner with a similar knowledge score (64th percentile) vs. 
one with a substantially lower score (36th percentile) or 2) a discussion partner with a similar 
knowledge score (70th percentile) vs. a substantially higher score (98th percentile). In all cases, 
participants chose between two discussion partners that both have the opposite opinion on the 
issue that will be discussed. 
Suspicion Probe. After participants made their choice of discussion partner, they were 
given the following suspicion probe: “Before we begin, please jot down as specifically as you 
can what you think will happen during the online discussion.” If participants expressed that they 
did not believe the discussion would be real, they were removed from the sample (see 
Participants section above). Then participants were told that they would not be having a 
discussion with another person and were informed about the purpose of the study. 
Results 
 I hypothesized that participants would choose a discussion partner with a similar 
knowledge score (i.e. close to 67th percentile) when the alternative choice was a partner with 
substantially lower knowledge. Further, I hypothesized that participants would choose a 
discussion partner with a similar knowledge score when the alternative choice was a partner with 
substantially higher knowledge. To test this hypothesis, I entered condition (0 = extremely low 
knowledge alternative; 1 = extremely high knowledge alternative) into a binary logistic 
regression predicting choice of partner (0 = similar to own knowledge; 1 = alternative). Further, I 
added participants’ ratings of their perceived knowledge on the death penalty as a covariate to 
control for individual differences in perceived knowledge that existed before the fake quiz 
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feedback was given to participants. As expected, participants chose the discussion partner with 
similar knowledge on the death penalty more frequently than a substantially less knowledgeable 
alternative. Unexpectedly, however, participants chose the substantially more knowledgeable 
alternative partner more frequently than the similar knowledge partner. Put simply, participants 
in both conditions chose the more knowledgeable partner. The main effect was significant, (b = 
.15, SE = .05), z(437) = 3.11, p = .002, 95% CI [.05, .24]. Going from the condition in which the 
alternative partner was substantially less knowledgeable to the condition in which the alternative 
partner was substantially more knowledgeable led to 16% greater odds of choosing the 
alternative, OR = 1.16, 95% CI [1.06, 1.27]. That is, people preferred a similarly knowledgeable 
partner to an alternative that was substantially less knowledgeable but increased their preference 
for an alternative partner when they were substantially more knowledgeable than the participant. 
 I also tested the Condition × Perceived Knowledge interaction to test if the effect of 
condition was weaker or non-existent for participants with low perceived knowledge and 
stronger for participants with high perceived knowledge. I ran the same binary logistic regression 
model with the Condition × Perceived Knowledge interaction term. The interaction was 
marginally significant, (b = .16, SE = .10), z(436) = 1.62, p = .105, 95% CI [-.03, .35]. The effect 
of condition was not significant when participants had low perceived knowledge (-1SD; 
perceived knowledge score = 3.67 out of 9), (b = .28, SE = .27), z(436) = 1.04, p = .300, 95% CI 
[-.25, .82]. However, the effect of condition got progressively stronger as perceived knowledge 
went up and became significant once participants reached 4.61 out of 9 on the perceived 
knowledge scale, (b = .43, SE = .22), z(436) = 1.96, p = .050, 95% CI [.00, .86]. This effect 
remained significant and continued to get stronger for participants as they reported higher 
perceived knowledge (i.e. +1SD; perceived knowledge score = 7.73 out of 9), (b = .92, SE = .28), 
  28  
z(436) = 3.29, p = .001, 95% CI [.37, 1.46]. Put simply, participants in both conditions chose the 
more knowledgeable partner but this effect was negligible when participants had low perceived 
knowledge and was strong when participants had high perceived knowledge (see Figure 4). 
Discussion 
The Study 3 findings show strong support for the idea that people are uninterested in 
arguing with someone who has substantially lower knowledge than they do. Perhaps this is 
because there is little to epistemically gain from a conversation with someone who is very low in 
issue knowledge—especially given that participants, on average, were above the midpoint on 
their perceived knowledge (M = 5.69 out of 9). Previous research shows that, when people 
counter-argue against weak arguments or against low-status sources, they do not become any 
more certain of their beliefs (Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004). I expected that participant 
preferences for a relatively more knowledgeable partner would be diminished when the partner 
had a substantially higher knowledge score (as opposed to one that is similar to the participant). 
Contrary to my expectations, however, participants preferred a partner with a substantially higher 
knowledge score than one that had a similar knowledge score to the participant. My primary 
argument was that people prefer challenging arguments to weak ones only to the degree that they 
believe they can successfully counter-argue the opposition. This main effect suggests that this 
preference extends to arguing with others who are ostensibly more knowledgeable on the topic. 
This is bolstered by previous research that shows that people become more certain after counter-
arguing against strong arguments or against high-status sources (Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004). 
It is possible that participants in Study 3 had anticipated how certain they might feel after 
arguing with a more versus less knowledgeable person. 
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The moderating effects of participant’s perceived knowledge provides clear support for 
my primary argument that people prefer to argue against knowledgeable others but only if they 
believe they are knowledgeable enough to successfully do so. The main effect of condition 
discussed above shows that people prefer to argue against knowledgeable others, but the 
interaction with participant perceived knowledge shows that this effect is non-existent for people 
low in perceived knowledge and is very strong for people high in perceived knowledge. In terms 
of Cognitive Energetics Theory, people with high perceived knowledge had a sufficiently high 
driving force that made them overcome the restraining force of arguing against a relatively more 
knowledgeable discussion partner. People with low perceived knowledge, however, were 
constrained by their available knowledge, making them less interested in arguing against a 
relatively more knowledgeable discussion partner.  
  Taken together, these findings corroborate and extend research that shows that people 
who believe they can effectively defend their beliefs are more likely to engage with belief-
inconsistent information than people who doubt their ability to defend their beliefs (Albarracín & 
Mitchell, 2004). The current research builds on this by demonstrating that people seek out more 
challenging arguments (i.e. by choosing more knowledgeable partners) even if their discussion 
partner is ostensibly more knowledgeable than the participant. It would be fruitful to explore the 
mechanism that drives this effect. Previous research would suggest that people who are high in 
perceived knowledge might engage in an argument with a disagreeing other with expectations 
that they will leave the conversation feeling even more confident in their beliefs (Albarracín & 
Mitchell, 2004).  
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
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 The research reported in this dissertation provides evidence for the idea that people prefer 
to counter-argue more difficult messages only if they are high in perceived knowledge. In Study 
1, participants who believed they knew little about the carbon tax increased their preference for 
arguing against the weaker argument when they chose between a moderate and strong argument 
compared to when they chose between a weak and moderate argument. On the other hand, when 
participants believed that they knew a lot about the carbon tax, there were no differences in 
argument preference. Although participants overall preferred to argue against the weaker 
argument, perceived knowledge of the carbon tax emboldened people to take on stronger 
arguments. It is important to state, however, that this effect be interpreted with caution as it was 
the only significant interaction out of four issues. 
 Study 2 demonstrated support for the idea that perceived knowledge predicts desire to 
counter-argue more strongly when the argument was strong than when it was weak. This 
supports the proposition that people who believe they can beat strong arguments will prefer them 
to weak arguments because they offer a better opportunity to reaffirm one’s sense of certainty 
(Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004). Here, for the first time, I demonstrate that people can become 
more interested in attempting to counter stronger threats to their beliefs (as opposed to weak 
threats) so as long as they believe they can defeat them. This is consistent with research showing 
that people with high confidence that they can defend their attitudes will show smaller 
information-selection biases in favor of information that supports their beliefs (Albarracín & 
Mitchell, 2004).  
In order to improve upon Study 1, I included in Study 2 a more specific measure that 
gauges one’s perceived ability to counter-argue. The analysis of mechanism demonstrated that 
people’s expectations of effective counter-arguing explain the relationship between argument 
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strength and choice of whether to counter-argue or ignore the information (i.e. do an unrelated 
task). These findings support the idea that people prefer direct defenses (e.g. counter-arguing) to 
indirect defenses (e.g. ignoring, trivialization; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997), but 
only if they are sufficiently confident the use of direct defenses will be successful. This is 
because indirect defenses leave cognitive discrepancies intact whereas direct defenses do not. 
Thus, the participants in Study 2 likely chose to counter-argue when they believed they could 
because they were motivated to resolve the inconsistency between their beliefs and the message 
they read. When they thought they might not be able to counter-argue effectively, they resorted 
to ignoring the message by choosing to do the unrelated task.  
 In Study 3, I used a novel paradigm in which people chose among different debate 
partners who differed in knowledge. The results showed that people largely preferred to debate 
the more knowledge person. Interestingly, this preference was strengthened when people chose 
from a relatively more knowledgeable set of potential debate partners—even when one of the 
debate partners was significantly more knowledgeable than themselves. Supporting my original 
hypothesis, I found that this effect was non-existent for people with low perceived knowledge 
and was strong for people with high perceived knowledge. This additionally provides support for 
the idea that people are willing to engage with difficult tasks if they believe it is the best means 
to goal attainment (e.g. to bolster one’s beliefs; Kruglanski et al., 2012). The results of Study 3 
extend this idea by suggesting that arguing against an ostensibly more knowledgeable person is a 
more ambitious goal for someone who wishes to reaffirm their beliefs. That is, successfully 
counter-arguing against an expert source makes one more certain of their beliefs than arguing 
against a non-expert source (e.g. Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004).  
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 Cognitive Energetics Theory (CET) suggests that people who are high in perceived 
knowledge have a higher driving force towards defending their beliefs because they assess their 
ability to be higher than people who are low in perceived knowledge. Thus, they believe they are 
more equipped to counter-argue belief-threats and should do so as long as their knowledge 
permits them. People who are low in perceived knowledge presumably believe they are limited 
in their ability to counter-argue (i.e. low driving force) and therefore their choices are more 
constrained by the strength of the arguments they encounter (i.e. high restraining force). Indeed, 
results from Studies 1 and 2 show that people increased their preferences for the easier option 
when they were given a relatively more difficult set of choices. However, in both studies it was 
clear that people who believed they knew a lot about the issue showed a smaller preference for 
taking the easier route than people who believed they knew little about the issue. Put simply, 
their preferences were less affected by the strength of the belief-inconsistent information because 
strong arguments do not create as much of a restraining force for someone who is high in 
perceived knowledge. This fits with the idea that people with limited cognitive resources (i.e. 
high cognitive load) rely on less informative cognitive shortcuts (e.g. consensus information) but 
people with available cognitive resources (i.e. low cognitive load) rely on more informative 
information such as argument content (Pierro et al., 2004). Lowering one’s cognitive resources 
via cognitive load may be functionally equivalent to lowering their perceived knowledge. That 
is, people do what they must in order to attain their goal (e.g. belief defense) but may be limited 
by their lack of knowledge or ability (Kruglanski et al., 2012).  
Study 3 somewhat diverges from Studies 1 and 2 such that, overall, people preferred the 
more difficult option (i.e. arguing against a more knowledgeable debate partner). However, 
  33  
consistent with Studies 1 and 2, people in Study 3 only preferred the more knowledgeable debate 
partner when they believe they themselves knew a lot about the issue to be discussed.  
 A plausible reason why the results of Study 3 somewhat diverge from Studies 1 and 2 is 
the level of uncertainty associated with the belief-threat. When people read the arguments in 
Studies 1 and 2, they were able to assess whether they could successfully counter-argue them. 
On the contrary, the paradigm of Study 3 leaves the specific belief-threats a mystery and uses a 
manipulation of debate partner knowledge. In such a case it is not clear what the other person 
knows, so participants might assume the partner possesses knowledge of arguments that threaten 
the participant’s position on the issue. CET might suggest that participants assessed the idea of 
arguing against a knowledgeable partner as a more worthwhile goal. For example, a highly 
knowledgeable debate partner might offer novel information that challenges the participants’ 
beliefs, which can be later used to further bolster their original position. CET states that people 
are willing to use more laborious methods of goal attainment, such as arguing against a highly 
knowledgeable person, if those methods are believed to have the greatest utility among other 
alternatives. If a person’s driving force is sufficiently high, such as having high perceived 
knowledge on an important issue, then it is plausible to expect that they will subject themselves 
to strong (and perhaps novel) belief-threats because it ultimately serves their goal of effective 
belief defense. 
Although all three studies provide some support for the hypothesis that people seek to 
refute strong belief-discrepant information if they are high in perceived knowledge, not all 
findings were as promising. In Study 1, support for this hypothesis was observed only for the 
issue of the carbon tax and not for gun control, the junk food tax, or the death penalty. One 
possibility is that the carbon tax was more important to participants than other issues, which 
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might explain why there was a heightened desire to counter-argue against information against 
their beliefs on this issue. However, the data do not support this explanation. Participants rated 
gun control, the carbon tax, and the death penalty as similarly important (M Gun control = 6.52, M 
Carbon tax = 6.34, M Death penalty = 6.32) with gun control rated the highest and the junk food tax rated 
the lowest (M Junk food tax = 5.79). Another possibility is that the issue of the carbon tax was the 
most novel and unfamiliar issue and thus more susceptible to the experimental manipulation. 
However, additional data would be required to test this possibility. 
The three experiments reported here provide an informative test of Cognitive Energetics 
Theory as it applies to belief defense. People in these experiments were made to reconcile the 
driving force towards defending their beliefs and the restraining force of how difficult they 
would be to defend. These data show that, under specific circumstances (high perceived 
knowledge in Studies 1 and 3; high expectations of effective counter-arguing in Study 2), people 
are willing to seek out strong arguments against their beliefs. This is a crucial test of the idea that 
people might see an epistemically beneficial opportunity in arguing against strong belief-
inconsistent arguments, so as long as the arguments do not pose an epistemic risk. If successfully 
counter-arguing against strong belief-inconsistent information is a more worthwhile endeavor 
than arguing against weak information (Tormala & Petty, 2002; 2004), then people should seek 
out such opportunities if they assess their abilities as fit for the task. This is exactly what CET 
predicts. 
A crucial limitation of this research is that there was no assessment of the perceived value 
(e.g. novelty, potential increase in confidence) of arguing against one message over another or 
engaging with a particularly knowledgeable (vs. less knowledgeable) debate partner. For 
example, Albarracín and Mitchell (2004) found that people’s expectations that message 
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information would make them more confident in their beliefs was a primary mechanism driving 
their selective exposure effects. If, for some people, arguing against any belief-discrepant 
information made them more confident in their beliefs, then their decisions might have been 
driven by the desire to do the easier task rather than their perceived ability to counter-argue. It 
would be fruitful for future research to explore the different mechanisms that underlie choice of 
debate partner versus choice of arguments or tasks. 
Still, other knowledge gaps remain. For example, it is unknown whether people’s desire 
to counter-argue message information depends on whether they have encountered such an 
argument before. It is possible that people desire to counter-argue threats to their beliefs but, 
after successfully doing so, become less motivated to counter-argue similar arguments. It is also 
possible that people become more motivated because it is clearer that they will be successful. 
One way to address this issue is by assessing the novelty of the information to determine its 
effects on one’s desire to counter-argue or ignore it. Although it is plausible for novelty to be a 
factor in whether people engage with message information (i.e. choose to read or respond to it), 
other research has failed to find such a relationship (Albarracín & Mitchell, 2004). Nonetheless, 
it is possible that novelty could have played a role in the current research, especially in Study 3, 
in which some participants chose to interact with a disagreeing debate partner with substantially 
higher issue knowledge.  
This research calls attention to the importance of focusing on how belief-threatening 
messages are delivered and who is delivering them. For example, people are quick to doubt an 
out-group member’s reasons for criticizing them or their group, which leads people to 
substantially reduce their acknowledgement of the criticism (for a review, see Hornsey, 2005). 
However, if the same exact message comes from an in-group member, people become far more 
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receptive to the critical information. Thus, it is important to build on the current research by 
testing if our results change depending one the source of the information. 
Conclusion 
 The way people manage threats to their beliefs, self-interest, or behavior is crucial to 
adaptive functioning in everyday life. In political discussion, at school, in the workplace, at the 
doctor, and in close relationships, people will, at some point, be exposed to information that is 
inconsistent with their beliefs about the world or about themselves. The way people respond to 
such information is crucial for adaptive functioning because finding ways to ignore or discredit 
the information prevents oneself from accepting, perhaps badly needed, critical feedback. For 
example, people respond to negative medical information by questioning the accuracy of the 
tests as opposed to learning more about the condition with which they had supposedly been 
diagnosed (Ditto & Lopez, 1992). Additionally, people generally think they are less susceptible 
than others to widely documented biases such as self-serving biases and the Fundamental 
Attribution Error (i.e. “bias blind spot”; Pronin, Lin, & Ross, 2002). These defensive responses 
are key factors in preventing potentially adaptive behaviors (e.g. seeking medical treatment or 
self-improvement). By downplaying, refuting, or ignoring belief-threatening information, people 
are preventing themselves from developing more accurate beliefs about the world and 
themselves. 
 The research reported here reaffirms the pervasive tendency of people deciding to ignore 
(rather than confront) criticisms of their political beliefs. However, it has also demonstrated that 
people are willing to actively counter-argue if they believe they have the knowledge to do so. On 
one hand, it might not be helpful to our political discourse for people to get increasingly skilled 
at defending their beliefs. On the other hand, it seems more promising for people to feel 
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emboldened to engage with belief-threatening information than to ignore it, effectively raising 
their chances of shifting their views in light of the new information (Albarracín & Mitchell, 
2004). If people continue to engage in partisan selective exposure, they will continue to steer 
clear of potentially valuable criticism. Continuing to fill the knowledge gaps on how people 
defend their beliefs will be crucial for improving people’s receptivity to criticism and fostering 
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Appendix A 
Gun Control 
Favor Gun Control Strong. Several promising strategies are available to legislators who 
want to reduce the number of annual gun fatalities in the U.S. The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) estimates that a federal law requiring a waiting period of just one day would prevent at 
least one-third of annual gun suicides, saving more than 7,000 lives every year. Further, studies 
from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) show that the majority of homicides are committed 
with legal firearms (about 68%). The Bureau of Justice Statistics, the CDC, and independent 
researchers agree that making it more difficult to obtain guns will, even by conservative 
estimates, save thousands of lives per year. 
Favor Gun Control Moderate. Forensic scientists who have studied mass shootings in 
the U.S. argue that the availability of large magazines to hold large quantities of ammunition 
increased the number of fatalities over what would have been otherwise possible. The evidence 
they have uncovered suggests that banning magazines that hold more than 10 rounds would 
significantly reduce the lethality of typical mass shootings. Implementing a law limiting 
magazine size would save, on average, about a dozen lives each year, and should be a priority 
even if doing so is difficult. 
Favor Gun Control Weak. The fact that guns are so widely accepted in American 
culture is harmful and federal law should be used to change this. With the laws as loose as they 
are now, people are too casual about gun ownership and don’t take seriously enough the danger 
of these weapons. In a discussion with a friend of mine, he told me that he could buy a gun in his 
own state without even having to go through any training on gun laws or gun usage. We need to 
limit gun ownership in the U.S. so that we can do away with our gun obsession.  
Against Gun Control Strong. A Department of Justice (DOJ) analysis of data from 
states that have experimented with gun laws suggests that restricting access to guns would 
probably increase the number of gun deaths in the U.S. by about 10%. Scientists that work for 
the DOJ as well as Centers for Disease Control (CDC) show that 70% of convicted felons 
reported that they avoided committing crimes when they thought the victim might be armed. The 
Bureau of Justice Statistics provides evidence that restrictive laws have mostly taken guns away 
from law-abiding citizens interested in self-defense, but have left the criminal black market 
unaffected. As a result, ordinary citizens are less able to protect themselves because of the laws 
and become more vulnerable to criminal violence. 
Against Gun Control Moderate. No law would ever be able to take every dangerous 
weapon out of circulation. In fact, any attempt to restrict gun ownership would be 
counterproductive. While laws might decrease the total number of guns legally owned by the 
general public, forensic scientists from the suggest these laws would also increase the black 
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market trade of guns, which would be harder to regulate and would cause more violence. Gun 
control laws would also anger large parts of the American public, which is definitely not worth 
doing for something that probably won’t help anyway. 
Against Gun Control Weak. Gun control is basically pointless because anyone who 
uses a gun to kill or injure themselves or another person would almost definitely find another 
way to do it if they didn’t have access to a gun. If you ask a gun control activist to explain 
concretely how the laws they want would actually help, you’ll see that when it comes down to it 
they don’t know what they’re talking about and are really just looking for an excuse to limit 
peoples’ constitutional right to bear arms. It’s important to put gun control fanatics in their place, 
even if that means missing a chance to save a few lives. 
Death Penalty 
 
Favor Death Penalty Strong. Department of Justice crime data demonstrate that the 
possibility of a death sentence deters people from committing capital offenses. In states where 
the death penalty is in practice, there are 20-35% fewer capital offenses per year than in states 
where the death penalty is not used. While some argue this may result from economic disparities, 
the fact that the trend is so consistent, regardless of geographical or economic variation, makes it 
impossible to take this interpretation seriously. 
Favor Death Penalty Moderate. The National Center for Criminal Justice conducted 
systematic interviews with violent offenders that reveal that they often avoid committing crimes 
that put them at risk of a death sentence, even if they frequently break the law in ways that could 
earn them lengthy prison sentences. One inmate in Texas who was three years into a 12-year 
sentence for battery and assault with a deadly weapon explained that he learned his lesson when 
a member of his gang was convicted of murdering a rival’s brother and sentenced to death. 
While he can’t imagine avoiding crime completely when he is released, his gang has already 
softened their tactics in response to the sentencing and no longer use assassinations to send a 
message to enemies. 
Favor Death Penalty Weak. I asked several of my friends what they thought about the 
death penalty and they agreed that life in prison without parole is not a harsh enough punishment 
for the worst criminals, and that the death penalty is the only way to give them what they 
deserve. Clearly, some crimes are so awful that any punishment less than death would be 
insufficient. If we, as a society, let murderers off easy because the death penalty makes us 
uncomfortable, we are nothing more than a nation of cowards. 
Against Death Penalty Strong. The Innocence Project at Columbia Law School has 
documented hundreds of cases of individuals falsely convicted of a crime and sentenced to death. 
They estimate that as many as 20% of people sentenced to die for a capital crime in the last 50 
years were in fact innocent. Even more worrisome, this rate has not declined as forensic 
technologies have improved over the last two decades. Because of the limitations of DNA and 
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genetic analyses, the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, and biases that unavoidably affect 
jury deliberations, states that impose capital punishment are likely to continue the disturbing 
practice of murdering innocent people that are falsely accused of a crime.   
Against Death Penalty Moderate. The most common argument for capital punishment – 
that it deters violent crime – is not supported by evidence, according to the National Center for 
Criminal Justice. While advocates of the death penalty cite low capital crime rates in states that 
practice capital punishment as evidence of its effectiveness, several studies show that not every 
state that imposes the death penalty has lower rates than average. Furthermore, it is possible that 
states that enjoy relatively low crime rates owe this to cultural and/or economic, rather than 
legal, factors. It is therefore unknown whether the possibility of being sentenced to death 
decreases the incidence of capital crimes. And if we aren’t sure that the death penalty will deter 
future criminals, we shouldn’t do it. 
Against Death Penalty Weak. It is not acceptable to take another person’s life. The 
reason for this is that killing someone else causes dangerous and irreversible changes in one’s 
mind, so that afterward the killer loses his or her inhibition and is more likely to commit 
unprovoked violent acts. The same thing happens to American society as long as capital 
punishment is allowed. By using the death penalty to punish criminals, we become just as bad as 
them. Therefore, the only way to protect ourselves from being corrupted is to refuse to stoop to 
the level of violent criminals by punishing them with death. 
 
Junk Food Tax 
 
Favor Junk Food Tax Strong. A study published in the Annual Review of Public 
Health showed that 97% of cities that have implemented a so-called “junk food tax” saw at least 
a 26% decline in doctor visits over the first 5 years. Following up on this finding, the American 
Journal of Medicine published research showing that health care costs have fallen 24% in places 
that implement the junk food tax compared to a measly 2% over the same period in places that 
didn’t. Meanwhile, healthy packaged foods are becoming increasingly widespread and 
affordable, offering alternatives to low-income citizens for whom cost is the most important 
factor driving food choices.  
 
Favor Junk Food Tax Moderate. In recent months several major cities across the 
country have passed laws implementing a so-called “junk food tax.” These measures seem to 
have broad support, as the Pew Forum published polling data just last week that shows a clear 
majority of residents in those cities (65%) support the junk food tax. The tax could decrease the 
number of hospital visits and reduce overall medical costs, and the revenue cities collect from it 
will enable them to launch a new campaign to promote public awareness of nutrition. The 
combination of the tax and the campaign should significantly improve health outcomes. 
 
Favor Junk Food Tax Weak. Anyone can tell you that if something costs more money 
they will buy less of it. If U.S. governments want people to eat healthier, they should implement 
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a tax on junk food so that people won’t buy it anymore. Americans have a reputation around the 
world for unhealthy eating, and taxing junk foods would pressure restaurants and convenience 
stores to replace unhealthy options with whole foods like grains and vegetables. This would 
show the world that Americans care enough about their health to make difficult lifestyle changes 
when they have to, and that we are just as serious about nutrition as they are. 
 
Against Junk Food Tax Strong. Advocates for a so-called “junk food tax” think it 
would improve health and reduce medical costs, but a study by the Brookings Institution 
suggests this policy would actually harm the people it is designed to help. Brookings reports that 
any tax rate less than 30% would leave the basic economics of the situation as it is, with the least 
healthy options remaining the cheapest. Given this finding, a tax on junk food would most likely 
have no effect on the diets of low-income families and individuals, those who are the most 
vulnerable to dietary-related illnesses, while pushing them even further into poverty. 
Independent researchers confirm these findings. 
 
Against Junk Food Tax Moderate. A Quinnipiac poll found that a majority of 
Americans (58%) believe that a junk food tax would fail to reduce health care costs, and an even 
larger majority (71%) opposes it. While more research by economists and public health experts 
is still needed, there is reason to believe that the public is right to be skeptical. Tax increases on 
other products that harm public health, such as cigarettes, have not had much success reducing 
sales. Unless someone can make a good case for why junk food is different than cigarettes, 
introducing a special tax would be risky at best. 
 
Against Junk Food Tax Weak. People who want to implement a junk food tax need to 
mind their own business. Nobody likes taxes unless they are really necessary, but what makes 
the government an authority on which foods are good for you and which are bad? People’s 
opinions about diet and nutrition are always changing, and 5 years from now people might think 
the things we are told to avoid now, like sugar, are actually healthy while the things we’re told to 
eat a lot of, like green vegetables, are unhealthy. If we implement a tax on the foods we think are 




Favor Carbon Tax Strong. The vast majority of scientists agree that carbon emissions 
contribute to climate change, which they project to displace tens of millions of coastal residents 
in the coming decades. The U.S. can make a major contribution to slowing this process by 
following the Department of Energy’s (DoE) recommendation to impose a 20% tax on carbon 
emissions. Experts from the DoE estimate that this would reduce annual emissions by 30-35% in 
the U.S. and 7-8% globally. It isn’t only an environmental issue, the Institute for Economic 
Policy estimates that the carbon tax will save American taxpayers an average of $18 billion per 
year by reducing the impact of coastal flooding and natural disasters. 
 
Favor Carbon Tax Moderate. Most scientists from the Academy of Climate Science 
agree that climate change is happening because of enormous amounts of carbon emissions. The 
U.S. should take the lead by imposing a 20% tax on carbon emissions. Even if the experts 
estimates are correct and this step would only reduce global emissions a little (about 2%), other 
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major countries will likely follow suit. Cumulatively, this would slow the rise of global 
temperatures and buy time to develop protections against rising sea levels. 
 
Favor Carbon Tax Weak. Americans need to care more about the environment. The 
U.S. government should sanction anti-environment businesses by imposing a substantial tax on 
carbon emissions. These businesses are far too profitable and are filled with a bunch of greedy 
people that don’t care about the environment. People who pursue profit without regard to the 
environment need to finally get a bit of the punishment they deserve. It’s not good to consume so 
much of what this Earth has to provide. We need to get used to consuming less. 
 
Against Carbon Tax Strong. While most scientists agree that our carbon emissions 
contribute to climate change, economists are pessimistic about the power of any one nation to 
slow the rate of change without causing intolerable economic harm in the process. The 
Department of Energy estimates that, to reduce the global emissions rate by just 1%, a carbon tax 
of more than 50% would be required. The Chamber of Commerce, meanwhile, projects that this 
would force companies to cut up to 5 million jobs and cause the economy to shrink in ways that 
are comparable to the Great Depression. This would also include obvious difficulties for the U.S 
economy such as extremely high gas prices and utility bills. 
 
Against Carbon Tax Moderate. The U.S. should not implement a carbon tax. The 
Department of Energy estimates that a significant tax on carbon emissions would reduce annual 
U.S.-based carbon emissions by only very little. It could affect decent-paying jobs and might 
make gas companies do less business in the U.S. This would not be helpful to the economy. If 
this tax were implemented, large gas companies might be forced to downsize and significantly 
cut into their profits. 
 
Against Carbon Tax Weak. Although most scientists agree that our carbon emissions 
contribute to climate change, imposing a carbon tax would be counterproductive. Taxes are 
immoral and are just a reason for the government to take money away from people and 
businesses. The only justifiable ways of dealing with climate change are those that result from 
market demand, allowing self-interested individuals to compete for the business of people who 
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Appendix B 
Death Penalty Knowledge Quiz 





• As many as they want 
 














In 2008, states that did not allow capital punishment had a homicide rate that was: 
• Significantly lower than the national average (more than 50% lower than the national 
average) 
• Lower than the national average (5-49% lower than the national average) 
• The same as the national average 
• Higher than the national average (5-49% higher than the national average) 
• Significantly higher than the national average (more than 50% higher than the national 
average) 
 
California’s “three-strike law” made it: 
• Easier to give the death penalty to repeat offenders – and it was effective. 
• Easier to give the death penalty to repeat offenders – and it was ineffective. 
• Required life in jail for a three time offender – and is considered effective. 
• Required life in jail for a three time offender – and is considered ineffective. 
• So that lawyers are not allowed to play baseball. 
 
What is the average cost to taxpayers of life in prison? 
• $1 million 
• $10 million 
• $38 million 
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• $49 million 
• $98 million 
 
The number one comment from victims’ families is: 
• I felt an overwhelming sense of closure from this event. 
• I was surprised by the lack of closure I felt from this event. 
• I was not able the guilt I felt because of his/her actions. 
• I was relieved and happy that this person got what they deserved. 
 
What is the most accurate definition of capital punishment? 
• Physical punishment that involves deliberate infliction of pain as retribution for an 
offense, or for the purpose of disciplining or reforming a wrongdoer, or to deter attitudes 
or behavior deemed unacceptable. 
• Any punishment in which force is used and intended to cause some degree of pain or 
discomfort, however light. 
• The death penalty is the only example of capital punishment. 
• It is a legal term that does not mean anything. 
• Any time of punishment that is considered unpleasant by the offender. 
 
What is the most common form of capital punishment given throughout the history of the United 
States? 
• Lethal injection 
• Firing squad 
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Tables 
Table 1a 
Mean differences in argument strength ratings 
 Condition   
Issue Weak  Moderate t df 
Gun control 2.86 4.48 4.18*** 41 
Junk food tax 3.29 4.21 2.58* 37 
Carbon tax 3.27 4.17 3.24** 47 
Death penalty 2.60 4.97 6.20*** 29 
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Table 1b 
Mean differences in argument strength ratings 
 Condition   
Issue Moderate  Strong t df 
Gun control 3.87 4.84 3.13** 30 
Junk food tax 3.86 5.25 3.49*** 43 
Carbon tax 3.62 4.65 4.25*** 35 
Death penalty 3.48 4.68 2.37* 25 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Study 1 participants who chose the relatively weaker argument on the 
carbon tax as a function of Condition (Weak vs. Moderate; Moderate vs. Strong) and Perceived 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Study 2 participants who chose the counter-arguing task over the 
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Figure 3. Mediation model testing the indirect effect of condition (weak vs. strong) on choice of 
defense strategy (counter-argue vs. ignore) through expectations of effective counter-arguing. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of Study 3 participants who chose the alternative partner over one with 
similar knowledge to themselves as a function of Condition (Low knowledge alternative vs. High 
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